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Perspective
EARLY THOUGHTS ON PROSECUTING POLLUTERS
Kenneth A. Manaster*
Prosecution of polluters by officials of the various levels of government has not kept pace with the increasingly felt need for environmental protection. This Perspective presents reflections of a former
prosecutor who represented the people of Illinois in the beginning
stages of enforcing the new environmental laws of that State through
government-sponsored litigation. The author does not attempt an
exhaustive analysis of the varioussubjects discussed, ratherhe presents
his views of the general principles and policies involved and indicates
the concerns that prosecutors should bear in mind.

In most areas of the United States prosecution of polluters of the
environment is only beginning. At the state and local levels, as well as
at the federal level, only within the past few years have substantial
numbers of government-initiated lawsuits been filed to halt or punish
pollution-causing activites. Significant and substantial litigation of this
sort has already begun in Illinois,' particularly at the state level. The
purpose of this paper is, drawing from recent litigation experience in
Illinois, to offer some thoughts and questions concerning those prosecution policies and procedures which, in the long run, will be most
effective in abating pollution.
In a sense this paper is intended as a partial how-to-do-it manual
for a pollution prosecution office at any level of government. The
emphasis is upon the principal tools identified in Illinois thus far for
use by government lawyers in combatting pollution. No systematic
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara; A.B. 1962, LL.B.
1966, Harvard University. Former Assistant Attorney General and Chief of the
Northern Region, Environmental Control Division, Office of the Attorney General
of the State of Illinois.
1. Indications of the large number of suits recently filed in Illinois may be
found in the first, second, and third reports of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, dated Jan. 6, 1971, June 28, 1971, and Aug. 1972, respectively. To be compared to this is the fact that only three reported cases are found under the terms of
the public nuisance statute on the books in Illinois since 1874. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
1001/2, § 26.8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972).
Indications of the tremendous increase in federal water pollution suits may be
found at ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 121 (1972).
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philosophy or structural scheme will be offered. The author's intention
is merely to raise questions and offer a variety of insights which should
be considered by pollution officials at any level who wish to make full
use of the skills of lawyers and of powers exercised by courts and other
institutions in which lawyers function.
"Prosecution" is used here to refer less to criminal cases, as it is
usually defined, 2 than to official civil or administrative suits against
polluters seeking injunctive relief, monetary or other penalties, or combinations of such relief. Litigation of this latter sort has been more
frequent thus far than strictly criminal cases. For reasons which will
be discussed below, this predominance is both sensible and likely to
continue. '
At the outset it should be noted that an environmental prosecutor, when he seeks any sort of judicial or administrative relief, must
give careful attention to what he may realistically expect from such litigation and to what he should be prepared to justify to the affected public. He must depend primarily upon the statutory and judicial statements of his power existing in his jurisdiction. In a state such as Elinois where considerable and specific statutory powers are granted to
the Attorney General to pursue such litigation, there is no question as
to either common law or explicit statutory bases for seeking injunctions
and monetary penalties against polluters. 4 At other levels of government, however, authority to act is somewhat less clear. Entities such as
counties, municipalities, park districts, sanitary districts, drainage districts, forest preserve districts and mosquito abatement districts must rely
upon less direct indications in statutes and ordinances that arguably
2. "[T]he word 'prosecution' usually denotes a criminal proceeding." United
States v. Reisinger, 127 U.S. 398, 403 (1888).
3. Examples of non-criminal prosecutions are discussed throughout the text of
this paper. As of March 1972, only two criminal cases had been initiated under the
criminal provisions of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act. [ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
1111,
§§ 1044-45 (Smith-Hurd 1971)1-People v. Fry Roofing Co., No. 72-324
(Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., Crim. Div., filed Feb. 18, 1972). [2 ENv. RTR.-CR.
DEV. 1356 (1972)] and People v. Steelco Chemical Corp., No. 71-2059 (Cook
County, Ill., Cir. Ct., Crim. Div., filed July 27, 1971). As noted at note 1 supra,
considerably more civil proceedings under the Act had been brought by that time, including civil litigation related to the two criminal cases cited supra-Pollution Control
Bd. v. Fry Roofing Co., 4 Ill. App. 3d 675, 281 N.E.2d 757 (1972) and People ex rel.
Scott v. Steelco Chemical Corp., No. 71 CH 3517 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct.,
preliminary injunction orderedper stipulation, June 8, 1971 ).
4. The principal statutory provisions presently in force in Illinois are the Illinois
Environmental Protection Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, §§ 1001-51 (Smith-Hurd
1971), and the statement of the powers of the Attorney General in this field, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 14, §§ 11-12 (Smith-Hurd 1971). The older statute on public nuisances also remains in force. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l002, § 26.8 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1972).
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justify imposition of administrative cease-and-desist orders or permit the
entity itself to seek injunctive relief from the courts.5
Suffice it to say that a prosecutor acting for any agency of government must give careful attention to all possible bases for seeking relief,
whether his support be grounded in explicit legislative enactments or
inferred from the language of statutes or judicial decisions. Undoubtedly many jurisdictions do not have adequate prosecutory legislation at
present. Of the statutory provisions which have been enacted, many,
such as certain provisions of the Illinois statutes, are just now beginning
to undergo judicial scrutiny at the appellate level.' Thus, development
of the clearest and most effective (and constitutional) statements of
injunctive authority has by no means been completed. As part of this
development, and in the absence of explicit legislative grants of authority, it is necessary for prosecutors to employ imaginatively whatever plausible grounds for action they can find.7
The discussion which follows will focus on three major questions:
First, what substantive policy choices is environmental prosecution intended to promote? Second, what resources should be mustered in order
to pursue the desired policies? Third, what procedural routes should be
taken and what types of procedural problems should be expected in
environmental prosecution? These three questions are closely interrelated, and cannot readily be separated from one another. As a way
of approaching the overall question of why and how polluters should be
sued by government, however, this breakdown provides a useful means
for raising a number of important issues, as well as presenting a few
answers that the Illinois experience already offers.'
5. See Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. United States Steel Corp., 41 Ill. 2d 460,
243 N.E.2d 249 (1968); Rauland Division, Zenith Radio v. Metropolitan Sanitary
Dist., 2 Ill. App. 3d 35, 275 N.E.2d 756, 3 ERC 1173 (1971).
6. See North Shore Sanitary Dist. v. Pollution Control Bd., 2 Ill. App. 3d 797,
277 N.E.2d 754 (1972), motion for leave to appeal denied, No. 45052 (Ill. Sup. Ct.,
decided May 23, 1972); North Shore Sanitary Dist. v. Pollution Control Bd., 284
N.E.2d 376, 4 ERC 1393 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist., 1972), motion for leave to appeal
granted, No. 45295 (Il. Sup. Ct., decided Sept. 28, 1972); Pollution Control Bd. v. Fry
Roofing Co., 4 Ill. App. 3d 675, 281 N.E.2d 757 (1972); Gromer Supermarket, Inc.
v. Pollution Control Bd., No. 57013 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist., July 31, 1972).
7. See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Injunction and Penalties, People ex rel.
Scott v. Steelco Chemical Corp., No. 71 CH 3517 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., preliminary injunction ordered by agreement, June 8, 1971); Complaint, State v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, No. 69 CH 2194 (N.D. Ill., filed Oct. 23, 1969). See also Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); comments regarding intervention of Attorney General of Illinois in electric utility rate increase proceedings, [1969-1970] ILL.
ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. xxiii.
8. A good summary of recent actions of the Illinois Attorney General in this
field is found in [1969-19701 ILL. Air'y GEN. BIENNIAL REr. xix-xxix. Further in-

formation regarding official environmental activities and policies in Illinois is available through the office of the Attorney General, the Illinois Pollution Control Board,
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I
WHAT SUBSTANTIVE POLICY CHOICES IS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROSECUTION INTENDED TO PROMOTE?

The overriding general policy which the environmental prosecutor
serves is to stop pollution where it presently exists and to prevent it
from continuing or commencing in the future. His responsibility within this general policy is to bring to light, through adjudicatory processes, all the proof available to him regarding what he believes to be
violations of environmental protection laws and principles. It is then
for the adjudicatory body to determine whether or not the violation
shall be considered proven, bearing in mind that a balancing of various
private and public interests is often necessary.
As operational guidelines, however, these broad statements certainly are not very helpful. The prosecutor who wishes to be most effective, and the public official who wishes to establish an effective
prosecution office, must consider in greater detail how the tools of the
lawyer can best be used to further the goal of the overall policy. To
the extent that he thinks out in advance some of the questions he will
face and choices he must make, the greater the likelihood that he will
make a useful, rational contribution to pollution control.
The first question the environmental prosecutor faces is the practical determination of which polluters and which pollution will be the
focus of his efforts. The limitations of his staff and resources make
such choices inevitable, and a number of factors usually will influence
these decisions. It is not realistic to expect agencies of government to
be reliable, frequent litigators in opposition to proposed public construction projects or other governmental acts which may have adverse
environmental effects. The reason for this is that the government lawyer not only often works with the officials directly responsible for public
projects, but would most likely be called upon to defend those officials
if they were sued by other parties even on environmental grounds. 9
This is true of the Justice Department at the national level, of the attorney general's office of any state, or of the attorney for a given county or municipality. Therefore, prospective suits seeking to halt such
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, or the Department of Environmental
Control of the City of Chicago. Copies of decisions of the Pollution Control Board
may be obtained directly from the Board.
9. This problem arose in Farmers Opposed to Extension of the Illinois Tollway
v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 1971 Illinois Pollution Control Board [hereinafter Ill. P.C.B.1 No. 159 (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, Sept. 16, 1971). There,
counsel for the farmers requested the Attorney General of Illinois to intervene on

the complaining side, despite the fact that the Attorney General was bound to represent the respondents, official agencies of the state government.
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projects or to force disclosure of environmental impact information
must, as a general rule, be initiated by citizens and citizen groups.' °
This is not to say, however, that the attorney for one level of government will never sue for injunctive relief against a project proposed
To put the
under the auspices of a different level of government."
matter in a slightly different way, a government lawyer is unlikely to
sue his own client, but may not hesitate to sue institutions at another
level of government. He may be reluctant to do this, however, if he
feels that such action might backfire by setting12a precedent which other
officials might later use against his own clients.
Environmental prosecutions thus will take place most frequently
against polluters other than agencies of government. This does not
mean that a concerned prosecution office cannot serve a useful function
by acting as the conscience for other agencies of government which it
represents. In many instances, without getting to the level of litigation
against his own client, the government lawyer can bring some enlightenment and a fuller awareness of its responsibilities to a polluting
arm of government.

13

When the prosecutor turns his attention to non-governmental polluters, his usual targets are individual offenders. It is also very useful,
or even essential, to focus at times on categories of polluters in coordinated prosecution efforts. Categories may be selected on the basis
of various criteria. For example, the prosecutor may find reason to
concentrate upon air pollution cases, in preference to water or land pollution problems. He may wish to take a geographic perspective and
concentrate upon elimination of pollution in a particularly troublesome area, perhaps zeroing in on all the air pollution problems in a
specific locale or even on air, water, land, noise and other pollution
10. See, e.g., NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 3 ERC 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Conservation Council v. Froehlke, - F.2d -, 4 ERC 1044 (4th Cir. 1972); Concerned Citizens of Marlboro v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 332, 4 ERC 1042 (3rd Cir. 1972);
Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 4 ERC 1329 (D. Conn. 1972);
EDF v. Coastside County Water Dist., 27 Cal. App. 3d 695, 703, 104 Cal. Rptr.
197, 201, 4 ERC 1573, 1576 (1st Dist. 1972).
11. See, e.g., Illinois v. AEC, decided with Izaak Walton League v. Schlesinger,
337 F. Supp. 287,3 ERC 1453 (D.D.C. 1971).
12. One can imagine the hesitancy of an environmental prosecutor at the county
or state level to undertake an attack on a municipal project such as the unwise expansion or placement of a municipal airport if the county or state itself were contemplating similar activity elsewhere. This hesitancy would seem to be greatest if the
prosecutor is the political appointee of the officials in charge of such activity.
13. The Attorney General's office in Illinois in a few instances has called to the
attention of specific arms of the state government their duties to comply with the
state's environmental laws. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1047 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1971). One such instance related to air pollution caused by antiquated heating
equipment in state penal institutions.
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problems there. As a third category, efforts may be coordinated into
sets of prosecutions against a particular industry identified as causing
a specific type of pollution in a number of areas from basically the
same equipment or process. Such a group approach is helpful for inducing a particular industry to develop or put into operation a new
form of control technology.' 4 This is true especially if the technology
is so costly as to call for considerable investment and risk if only one
member of the industry were forced to consider it alone.
Prospective or anticipatory lawsuits against private polluters are
not as likely to occur as are suits with respect to existing pollution or
past incidents. This is so presently because there are so many existing
problems to contend with that it is difficult to deal with these and
simultaneously to venture into areas of potential pollution. 5 This is
not to say that such foresight would not be tremendously valuable. At
times litigation of this sort has been instituted with highly useful effects."8 It should be encouraged, and the technical backup necessary
for it should be provided whenever possible. Until the present problems which are just not being seriously attacked have been dealt with,
however, it remains unlikely that time will be taken by prosecutors to
contemplate incipient pollution problems which have not yet surfaced.
Generally, then, the major objective of government prosecutors is
to control existing pollution problems being created by non-governmental entities. Once this is accepted, a few other questions must be
immediately considered. First, it must be decided whether, as a general rule, immediate cessation of pollution is desired, or gradual cessation is favored so as to minimize disruptive effects on the pollutionproducing activities themselves, many if not most of which will have
some definite social value."7 This question, of course, could be taken
14. Comments on the Illinois Attorney General's emphasis on Lake Michigan
pollution and on steel mills discharging wastes into the Calumet River, and thus into
Lake Michigan, are found at [1969-1970] ILL. Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. xxi-xxiii.
15. If the prosecutor is an elected official, his natural inclination will be to deal
with obvious, existing problems rather than with future harm about which the voting
public is not yet complaining. However, in a jurisdiction in which there is considerable public concern over the adverse environmental effects of land development projects, public officials should be expected to be responsive to such concern. This is
particularly true for planning agencies and legislative bodies, and perhaps also for
prosecutors.
16. See Illinois v. AEC, decided with Izaak Walton League v. Schlesinger, 337
F. Supp. 287, 3 ERC 1453 (D.D.C. 1971) (potential thermal pollution of Mississippi
River from Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station at Cordova, Illinois); cf. Minnesota v.
Northern States Power Co., 447 F.2d 1142 (8th Cir. 1971), afj'd mem., 405 U.S.
1035 (1972) (federal government preempts states in matter of regulation of radiation
pollution); Commonwealth Edison v. Pollution Control Bd., 4 ERC 1303 (Ill. App. Ct.
3d Dist. 1972). See also comments regarding efforts to preserve a tamarack bog in
[1969-1970] ILL. Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. Xxvi.

17.

The question of disrupting socially important but pollution-causing activities
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up on a case-by-case basis without any general policy preference in
advance, but the question is important enough to be worthy of overall,
preliminary consideration. This would provide a basis, or at least
some criteria, for the particular decisions called for in specific cases.
A second important question to be considered is the extent to which
litigation completely through to judgment is to be aimed for as distinguished from conciliation or settlement either prior to filing of suit
or subsequent to filing. As will be discussed in greater detail below,
the expression of concern to a polluter by an agency of government
very often brings about the desired, corrective action.' 8 There is then
no practical need to go forward and file suit, except in the instance in
which it is considered useful to embody control methods in an enforceable court decree. The value of such a decree is often considerable,
inasmuch as it makes the polluter's new plan to correct his problem into an obligation backed up by the powers of the court.' 9 This is not
always a benefit worth the time and effort required to obtain it, as in
the case of small or easily correctable problems in which the good
faith or enlightened intentions of the polluter are clear. It may often
be found, furthermore, that voluntary, albeit delayed, compliance of
this sort can be achieved by investigative, non-legal personnel working
under the general supervision of lawyers. Such "field-settlements" are
often a valuable method of obtaining quick solutions to pollution com20
plaints voiced by citizens regarding small, specific pollution sources.
Assuming that conciliation and negotiation will not bring about
the desired result in all instances, and will not even be pursued in
some instances, the value of litigation itself must be carefully assessed.
For many types of pollution the most effective weapon of government
was vividly highlighted In the controversial "sewer ban" issued by the Illinois Pollution
Control Board. League of Women Voters of Illinois v. North Shore Sanitary Dist.,
1970 Il. P.C.B. Nos. 7, 12, 13, 14 (Mar. 31, 1971). The ban forbade new sewer connections in a vast suburban area until the North Shore Sanitary District had brought its
facilities into compliance with the applicable laws and regulations. The ban is presently being appealed. Appeal docketed sub nom. Lake County Contractors v. Pollution
Control Bd., Nos. 71-114, 71-115, Ill. App. Ct., July 31, 1972, appeal on certificate of
importance docketed, No. 45321, I11.Sup. Ct. See also North Shore Sanitary Dist. v.
Pollution Control Bd., 2 Ill. App. 3d 797, 277 N.E.2d 754, 4 ERC 1393 (1972), appeal
docketed, No. 45295, Ill. Sup. Ct., Sept. 28, 1972.
18. See text accompanying notes 51-53 infra.
19. See, e.g., People ex rel. Scott v. The Penn Central Co., No. 70 CH 5157
(Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., consent decree entered, Mar. 15, 1971) (cessation of
alleged public nuisance from refuse at pilings of railroad trestle in Little Calumet

River).
20. In numerous cases the investigators for the Environmental Control Division, Office of the Attorney General of Illinois, obtained such results with respect to a
wide variety of problems, e.g., a brick factory's dust emissions, a pig farm's odor, a
municipality's improper pesticide spraying, and a construction firm's open burning of
waste materials.
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is a court injunction requiring the cessation of the pollution-causing
activity-a negative injunction. A plausible threat of the imposition
of such relief is often sufficient in itself to bring about "voluntary" com21
pliance.
If this threat is to be made by the act of filing suit for such relief,
however, the prosecutor should only proceed if in fact he is prepared to
carry the case through trial with sufficient proof to justify this severe
remedy. This usually means that the prosecutor has available to him
reliable and credible citizen witnesses who can testify as to the basic
problem; that he is aware of all applicable laws, regulations, and
precedents which set out the standards of conduct that the defendant appears to have violated; that he has interviewed and obtained the
services of all expert witnesses necessary to prove the violations and
rebut predictable technical defenses; that he has obtained any necessary photographs or laboratory and field tests so as to be able to prove
the conditions of pollution caused by the defendant, as well as their
effects on life and property; and that he has a firm grasp of all
of the facts, with the help of a first-hand view of the situation, and an
awareness of what further information is needed that can only be obtained through discovery. If negative injunction suits are filed lightly
and without sufficient preparation, the plausibility of the injunction
threat will be lost. Both polluters and the complaining public will
soon become aware that suits are being filed, but are not being pursued to trial, or are being lost there.
Thorough preparation, such as that required for negative injunction suits, is also essential if the relief aimed at is mandatory injunctive
relief, that is, an order on the polluter to take certain steps to modify
or improve his activities so as to eliminate or reduce the pollution.
Clearly the prosecutor must be prepared to put on proof of the technical
feasibility and effectiveness of the particular steps he would like to
have taken. 2 As a general rule it may be said that mandatory relief
is always preferable to negative injunctive relief because the effect of
21. See, e.g., People ex rel. Scott v. Steelco Chemical Corp., No. 71 CH 3517
(Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., preliminary injunction ordered by agreement, June 8,
1971) (operation of ferric chloride production equipment) [2 ENv. RPTR.-CuRR. DEV.
181 (1971)]; see also People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., No. 71 CH 1410 (Cook
County, Ill., Cir. Ct., stipulation entered, Mar. 22, 1972) (abatement plan for phenolic
air emissions); People v. United States Steel Corp., No. 69 CH 3334 (Cook County,
Il., Cir. Ct., consent decree entered, Jan. 18, 1971) (requiring recycled process water
system at steel mill).
22. An outstanding example of such preparation was the extensive and sophisticated technical expertise brought to bear by the Attorney General in People v. United
States Steel Corp., No. 69 CH 3334 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., consent decree entered, Jan. 18, 1971) in order to establish for the first time the feasibility of a closed
system for water wastes at a major steel plant. See also discussion of this case in
[1969-19701 ILL. Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. xxi-xxii.
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the former is to continue the activity, with its benefits to society,
while reducing the polluting by-products, whereas the latter does eliminate the pollution but may well eliminate other useful products or services as well. Obviously, negative relief is difficult to justify, and realistically the courts cannot be expected to impose it, with respect to
basic services such as transportation, sewage treatment, electric power,
and the production of basic commodities such as steel and oil.2 3
The deterrent effect of pollution prosecutions does seem to be considerable. That is, it is highly likely that vigorous prosecution of a certtain type of polluter will be noticed by other polluters of the same type.
The polluter on the sidelines quickly begins to envision and assess his
posture in similar litigation. Often the result is either a quiet but
prompt cleanup or an inquiry to the prosecuting authorities as to just
what he must do in order to avoid being next.24 This logical tendency
on the part of polluters, whether they be business concerns or public

entities, such as municipalities and sanitary districts, brings us to the
question of whether prosecution efforts are best directed at a smaller
number of larger cases or at a large, random number of small or medium-sized cases. There is no easy answer to this question, and it would
seem that a blend is probably inevitable.

The responsible environ-

mental prosecutor cannot avoid attending at least to some of the major
sources of pollution in his area.25 At the same time, especially if he
holds an elective office or has been appointed by an elected official, he

cannot afford to ignore the large number of citizen complaints concerning relatively small sources of pollution.2"
23. See note 17 supra.
24. During the trial of Moody v. Flintkote Co., 1970 Ill. P.C.B. No. 36, 1971
111. P.C.B. No. 67 (Sept. 2, 1971), it was reported to the office of the Attorney General
by personnel of the state Environmental Protection Agency that another asphalt saturating company in the immediate vicinity of Flintkote's plant had quickly ordered and
begun to install control equipment of the type being proven most effective during the
course of the trial. In this case the attorney general had intervened on behalf of the
Agency as a co-complainant with the citizen Moody.
25. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Minnesota v.
Northern States Power Co., 447 F.2d 1142 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S.
1035 (1972); Illinois v. AEC, decided with Izaak Walton League v. Schlesinger,
337 F. Supp. 287, 3 ERC 1453 (D.D.C. 1971); State v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n,
No. 69 C 2194 (N.D. Ill., filed Oct. 23, 1969); Commonwealth Edison v. Pollution
Control Bd., 4 ERC 1303 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1972); North Shore Sanitary Dist.
v. Pollution Control Bd., 2 Ill. App. 3d 797, 277 N.E.2d 754, 4 ERC 1393 (1972);
People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., No. 71 CH 1410 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct.,
stipulation entered, Mar. 22, 1972); People ex rel. Scott v. Steelco Chemical Corp.,
No. 71 CH 3517 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., preliminary injunction ordered by

agreement, June 8, 1971); People v. United States Steel Corp., No. 69 CH 3334 (Cook
County, Ill., Cir. Ct., consent decree entered, Jan. 18, 1971); League of Women Voters

of Illinois v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 1970 Ill. P.C.B. Nos. 7, 12, 13, 14 (Mar. 31,
1971).
26. See note 15 supra.
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Mention has already been made above of the need for the prosecutor carefully to consider whether he really would wish to have the
polluter's activities stopped by a negative injunction. Looked at in a
slightly different way, it must be asked what the prosecutor's duty is
when it comes to evaluating the hardship the polluter may suffer if he
is required to cease his activities altogether or is required to correct
them. When speaking of a manufacturing concern, for example, it is
logical to consider that any changes in operation which either curtail
production or increase costs can have adverse effects on the owner, the
employees and the customers. The responsible prosecutor cannot be
unmindful of these effects. However, in all but the clearest cases it
would seem that balancing of hardship to the polluter against detriment
to the citizenry from the pollution is a process which rests with the
adjudicating body, and not with the prosecutor.2 7
The prosecutor generally should not be dissuaded from action by
virtue of the fact that he knows that claims of hardship will be heard
by way of defense or mitigation for the polluter. In some instances
it undoubtedly will be apparent to the prosecutor that certain types of
relief will not be granted by the court in view of obvious hardship or
detriment to significant numbers of employees, to the provision of basic
public services, 28 or to the survival of a marginally profitable but socially useful enterprise. In such situations the prosecutor either must
decide that action in court is realistically out of the question, or he
must seek to develop a conception of other, suitable relief which might
be obtained in court or elsewhere. In any event, the responsible prosecutor must be sensitive to these questions. In part this sensitivity
will include a sharp ability to assess the credibility of polluters' claims
of hardship and impending economic disaster if compliance with the
law is required.
Related to the question of hardship is the issue of monetary penalties or other sanctions.29 One does not have to be involved in many
27. See text accompanying note 8 supra. See also EPA v. Lindgren Foundry
Co., 1970 Ill. P.C.B. No. I (Sept. 25, 1970); Moody v. Flintkote Co., 1970 Il. P.C.B.
No. 36, 1971 Ill. P.C.B. No. 67 (Sept. 2, 1971).
28. Village of Bensenville v. City of Chicago, No. 70 CH 3184 (Cook County,
Ill., Cir. Ct., motion to dismiss granted per curiam, Oct. 28, 1971). In commenting
upon the plaintiff municipalities' prayer for injunctive relief against the expansion of
runway facilities at O'Hare International Airport, the court stated:
Thus the Count I [injunctive relief] issue places the rights of the plaintiff

municipalities in direct conflict with the interests of (a) air transportation;
(b) the further development of the world's busiest airport; (c) economic
progress; and, (d) the handmaiden of both, national defense.
Id. (emphasis in original).
29. At present the principal monetary penalty provisions in Illinois are found in
Illinois Environmental Protection Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11112, § 1042 (SmithHurd 1971). This section provides a $10,000 maximum initial penalty for violation
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pollution cases before one hears the plea that it is ludicrous to impose a
monetary penalty upon a polluter when the money could be more sensibly spent directly for pollution control equipment or process changes.
There is undoubtedly validity to this claim in some instances, but the
deterrent effect of penalties nevertheless should not be overlooked. It
would seem that many or most polluters are probably not morally any
less sensitive or responsible than was the majority of the public a few
short years ago as it collectively ignored the developing environmental
crisis. Nevertheless, imposition of a monetary penalty on a polluter
can serve as an instructive example to another polluter who might be
tempted to avoid correcting his pollution problem until he is sued or
is about to be sued. This is only true, however, if the penalty is substantial enough to be felt by the polluter and would have a similar impact
on the next potential defendant.
The magnitude of penalties, however, should not be such as to
be counterproductive in a particular case where they are imposed. That
is, in a case in which the polluter is ordered or allowed to make necessary corrections to solve his pollution problem, and is not ordered to
shut down, it would be foolish to impose a penalty so great as to make
it economically impossible to continue in business. Such an indirect
result might be justifiable only in the case of an exceptionally dilatory
and contemptuous polluter. Such a polluter would also seem to present the most appropriate case for criminal penalties, that is, for proceedings in the criminal courts which may result in the stigma of a
criminal conviction and even imprisonment.3 0 Other than in instances
such as those, it would seem society's purposes will be best served by
civil or quasi-criminal proceedings under statutes, ordinances, and the
common law for injunctive relief and limited monetary penalties. Environmental prosecutions of this sort, after careful attention to the
types of policy questions just considered, will make a definite, substantial, and cumulative contribution to the abatement and prevention of
pollution.
of any regulation, order, or determination of the Illinois Pollution Control Board with

an additional penalty not to exceed $1000 for each day the violation continues. Such
penalties may be recovered in a civil action.
30. See note 3 and accompanying text supra. The Illinois Environmental Protection Act provides for the following criminal remedies:
It shall be a misdemeanor to violate this Act or regulations thereunder, or
knowingly to submit any false information under this Act or regulations
adopted thereunder. It shall be the duty of all state and local law-enforcement officers to enforce such Act and regulations, and all such officers shall
have authority to issue citations for such violations.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. lll1/ 2 , § 1044 (Smith-Hurd 1971).
(a) No existing civil or criminal remedy for any wrongful action shall be
excluded or impaired by this Act.
Id. § 1045.
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II
WHAT RESOURCES SHOULD BE MUSTERED IN ORDER TO
PURSUE THE DESIRED POLICIES?

The principal resources necessary for effective environmental prosecution are qualified legal and technical personnel, and money. The
number of attorneys required in a given prosecution office obviously is
related to the nature of the caseload and the policy choices which have
been made concerning how that office will function. The relative
newness of the field of environmental law carries with it a certain benefit for the staffing of a prosecution office. That is, there is no one
particular area of expertise or experience which an attorney is likely
to have gained elsewhere that is a clear prerequisite for environmental
prosecution work. Accordingly, attorneys with one or two years of
general practice or general litigation and many recent law school graduates with no prior professional experience have proved to be quick
learners and imaginative pioneers in serving in environmental prosecution offices.
The problem of technical personnel is somewhat more complicated. Ideally a prosecutor should have a background in engineering,
particularly in those fields of engineering most often involved in pollution control questions, or in chemistry or biology. Since there are not
many attorneys with this type of training, the attorney without a technical education must rely upon trained engineers, chemists, biologists,
and other qualified persons who can make available to him the information and evaluations he will need in assessing pollution problems
and solutions. In this connection, two questions must be considered:
First, what technical input, if any, is really necessary? Second, if such
input is necessary, how can it best be obtained?
With regard to the first question, one view is that the only prerequisite for a case against a polluter is a citizen who can present plausible testimony on the unpleasant or harmful effects of a specific
source." In this approach it is unnecessary to introduce into a prosecution the skills and expert opinions of technical experts in such fields
as control technology, chemical analysis, and medicine and biology.
There is some logic to this, inasmuch as the essence of a pollution
complaint based on nuisance law, whether filed by an individual or
by an agency of government, usually is that someone's activities are
harming or annoying someone else in the same vicinity. The fact re31. The value of such testimony was clearly demonstrated in Molex, Inc. v.
EPA, 1971 Ill. P.C.B. No. 200 (Jan. 6, 1972); Moody v. Flintkote Co., 1970 Ill. P.C.B.
No. 36, 1971 Ill. P.C.B. No. 67 (Sept. 2, 1971); People v. American Asphalt Co.,
No. 70 CH 3660 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. CL, Apr. 14, 1971).
See generally
Leahy, Individual Remedies Against Pollution in Illinois, 3 LOYOLA U.L.J. 1 (1972).
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mains, nevertheless, that technically qualified investigative and advisory
personnel are essential to the development and presentation of an effective prosecution in almost all regulation violation cases and in all but
the simplest of nuisance cases.
It is true that a determined, reasonably articulate and persistent
citizen can usually induce a government agency to take notice of his
complaint.3 2 He also may be able to provide the prosecuting agency
with considerable evidence, perhaps even enough to see the case
through from beginning to end. As a general rule, however, individual
citizens do not have the persistence or the familiarity with evidencegathering techniques that are necessary in order to develop a case. For
this purpose it is of tremendous value to the prosecutor to have available his own staff of investigators, both to assist in the development of
cases before filing and to follow up needs for additional evidence after
filing. It is not essential that such investigative personnel have any
particular scientific or technical background, although obviously this
would be desirable. Basically all that is required is a careful introduction to proper methods of identifying and questioning witnesses, taking
air and water samples, handling physical evidence in general, taking
photographs, and presenting testimony.
With respect to almost any complicated manufacturing process or
public utility, the attorney will find invaluable the explanation of processes which can be provided by technical advisory personnel. This allows the attorney to have a better understanding of the equipment and
activities which form the basis of the suit. Obviously, understanding
of this sort is essential in order to identify clearly the exact source of
the pollution. At a minimum it allows the prosecutor to avoid focusing
on the wrong discharge source during trial, meeting consequently a
wholly effective technical defense. It is also essential in a case in
which violations of technical statutes and regulations--e.g., air or
water quality standards, allowable air contaminant emission rates, effluent regulations, ground water pollution standards, and monitoring
33
and reporting requirements-are alleged.
In the course of trial it is even more imperative that the attorney
have access to advisors to explain esoteric aspects of defenses raised and
to serve as expert witnesses in rebuttal. The necessity for having such
32. Moody v. Flintkote Co., 1970 Ill. P.C.B. No. 36, 1971 111. P.C.B. No. 67
(Sept. 2, 1971), is a striking instance of the effectiveness of an individual's complain-

ing to the government firmly, repeatedly, and clearly enough to obtain results.

The

complainant refused to accept the daily interference of heavy asphalt fumes and particles in his work environment. He bolstered his complaints to the government with a
complaint filed in his own name against the offending company with the Illinois Pollu-

tion Control Board. See also note 24 supra.
33.

Id.
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expert witnesses available can usually be predicted in advance of trial
with a high degree of accuracy. An additional reason contributing to
the value of technical personnel is that in many cases it is only by a
thorough understanding of technical processes involved and the raw
materials used that a case can be made out as to the full range and
severity of adverse effects of the pollution involved upon life and
property. The technical assistance necessary for this purpose includes
expertise regarding the processes in question and
regarding the biologi34
cal and physical effects of the pollutants emitted.
In addition to the use of his own investigative and advisory staff,
the prosecutor frequently must consider obtaining his technical input
from other sources. He then faces the question of the relationship of
the prosecutorial arm of government to other investigative or enforcement agencies in the pollution field. It is imperative that the relationship of the prosecuting office to investigative, licensing, permit-issuing,
and other regulatory or enforcement agencies with related or overlapping jurisdiction be clarified as early and fully as possible. There
are a number of reasons for this. First, such an agency can provide
needed technical assistance of many types, depending upon the range
of its own authority and the size of its budget. Such experts hopefully
can be available not only in cases in which the prosecutor represents
that agency, but also in cases the prosecutor may pursue under other
authority available to him. Second, if the prosecutor is to act as the
attorney for such an agency, obviously he will represent his client well
only if communications with that client are smooth and clear. Third,
the prosecutor must coordinate closely his litigation with related administrative actions, such as the granting or revoking of operational
permits for pollution-producing or pollution-controlling equipment. In
the absence of such coordination, the prosecutor will invite the embarrassment and wasted time and effort of filing a suit against a polluter
only to find that the polluter's activities have already been, or are about
to be, approved by another agency of government, perhaps even in
such a manner as to provide a substantial or complete defense to the
lawsuit. Fourth, it is only sensible that there be as much coordination
as possible between agencies of government acting in the same field,
simply so as to avoid needless duplication of effort and expenditure of
35
resources.
There are undoubtedly other good reasons that might be cited to
34.

Id.

35.

An example of close coordination between state, county, and local officials

is reflected in the stipulation in People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., No. 71 CH 1410
(Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., stipulation entered, Mar. 22, 1972). A failure to coordinate is reflected in Molex, Inc. v. EPA, 1971 II. P.C.B. No. 200 (Jan. 6, 1972), motion to reopen denied, Jan. 31, 1972.
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show the wisdom of close coordination between environmental prosecutors and other environmental arms of government. Those just mentioned would seem to be most significant as contributing to efficient
and effective prosecution. It should also be noted that the environmental lawyer in government, in dealing with other environmental
agencies, often finds himself serving a coordinating function. The attorney frequently serves as an intermediary between an investigative
or licensing agency and a polluter who is actually attempting to solve
his problems, but who has for some reason or another established an
ineffective pattern of communication with the agency. Similarly, the
attorney at the state or county level may be able to help find an effective solution to a pollution problem which has become the subject of
heated emotions and ineffective communication between a polluter and
36
a local government entity.
Another useful function can be performed by the attorney in directing the well-intentioned or belatedly enlightened polluter to available sources of technical expertise and pollution control advice and
equipment. This last function raises the interesting question of
whether or not the attorney can fulfill a proper and useful role by assisting the polluter to remedy its operational problems directly. There
have been notable instances in which a prosecuting agency, when
faced with a polluter seeking to solve its problems but unable to come
up with a sound technical approach, has commissioned the services of
an outside consultant to study the problem and recommend a solution." When such a solution is ultimately accepted, the result is that
the government, in effect, has paid for some part of the cost of the
polluter's corrective program. This result is sensible, however, inasmuch as the prosecutor without such assistance available to him is unable to act with equal status in settlement discussions and, if the case
were to proceed to trial, would be unable to rebut technical defenses
raised. Accordingly, instances will arise in which the prosecutor will
be found to have suggested, and, in a sense, paid for, the ideas which
ultimately solved the problem. Expenditures of this sort may also be
necessary when categories of prosecutions are conceived and developed
with respect to particular industries, geographic areas, or types of
pollution problems, as discussed above. 3
A systematic approach to
the analysis of such categories of problems and to their solution is a cost
usefully borne by the public through the office of the prosecutor. This
is not to suggest, however, that efforts should not be exerted whenever
36.
Ill., Cir.
37.
38.

See People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., No. 71 CH 1410 (Cook County,
Ct., stipulation entered, Mar. 22, 1972).
See note 22 supra.
See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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possible to compel the polluters themselves ultimately to bear such
expenses.
To the extent that needed technical personnel are available within
government agencies, it is desirable to use them, rather than to incur
additional costs for outside consultants. An additional reason for
adopting this approach may develop from the fact that, as environmental correction programs and litigation increase, it becomes more
profitable for consultants to make their services available to polluters
for assisting in abatement programs and litigation defense. Such consultants may be unwilling to cross the line and risk the "taint" of having
an association with a prosecutorial agency at any time. Some highly
qualified pollution control engineers, chemists, and other experts are
available, however, both as individuals and through consulting and research concerns and universities. Thus, when the needed personnel
are not available within government, or when the services of a particular type of private expert on a specific subject are essential, outside
assistance can be and should be sought.
The heavy costs of acquiring technical assistance compel attention to the best allocation of what ordinarily are limited funds. At
this stage in the development of environmental prosecution, expenditures on technical personnel are much more useful than expenditures
on technical equipment for the measurement, monitoring, and analysis
of pollution phenomena. Given the burgeoning caseloads of prosecutors, emphasis is better placed on people and the ideas they can bring
to this work, rather than on expensive hardware, which may not be
very frequently used or even fully understood. The most desirable
situation would allow sufficient funds for the employment, training, and
active utilization of full-time legal and technical personnel of high
quality, and at the same time for the acquisition of expert assistance
and technical equipment to buttress the prosecution effort when neccessary.

WHAT PROCEDURAL ROUTES SHOULD BE TAKEN AND WHAT TYPES
OF PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS SHOULD BE EXPECTED
IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROSECUTION?

Much of what has already been discussed, particularly with regard to policy choices, relates closely to the question of what procedural paths environmental prosecutors will follow. The available
routes will depend principally upon the delineation of powers of prosecution in statutory law and judicial decisions."
One basic question
39.

See note 4 supra.
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which must be confronted is whether proceedings should be pursued in
court or before an administrative tribunal, if that option is available.
In many jurisdictions, environmental boards with adjudicatory powers
have been vested
have recently been established, or existing boards
40
with new powers or have acquired new enthusiasm.
The prosecutor faces a complex range of considerations once he
has the option of proceeding in courts of law and equity or before an
administrative board. One exceptionally strong consideration is the
degree of expertise and familiarity with pollution problems and solutions
that the administrative tribunal, or specialized "pollution court," can
develop. 4 This specialization is to be contrasted with the considerably
broader range of ordinary judicial duties, even if only the chancery
courts are considered. On the opposite side of the coin are questions
of enforcement and timing. In some instances the fact that enforcement of administrative orders may ultimately have to proceed in court
may dictate acting in court at the outset, so as to minimize total time
in bringing a recalcitrant polluter to account. 42 And in certain instances,
the need for immediate injunctive relief will require action in court if, as
possess preliminary
is most likely, the administrative tribunal does not
43
enforced.
quickly
be
can
which
powers
restraining
Related to the issue of administrative action is the effect to be
given to permits, licenses, variances and other forms of administrative
approval. This area of concern is important if for no other reason than
to avoid possible embarrassment when agencies of government take inconsistent positions. 44 As an added consideration, the prosecutor
must decide whether he wishes to raise in a judicial forum questions of
the validity or effect of administrative licenses, when the option exists
to raise such questions before the licensing administrative entity or a
related quasi-judicial board. For example, if installation or operating
permits for pollution-related equipment are issued or refused by an administrative agency, it may well be that the integrity and coherence of
the permit system will be best protected by hearing complaints before
the administrative tribunal whenever possible.4 5 That tribunal pre40.
41.

See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1IlY , §§ 1005, 1049 (Smith-Hurd 1971).
One example of such specialization is the so-called "smoke court" estab-

lished within the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, to sit on specified days to
hear alleged violations of the City of Chicago Environmental Control Ordinance,
CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 17, § 17-1 et seq. (1970).
42. Cf. Pollution Control Bd. v. Fry Roofing Co., 4 Ill. App. 3d 674, 281 N.E.
2d 757 (1972).
43. See Hemmerich v. Fry Roofing Co., 1971 Ii. P.C.B. No. 33 (May 12,
1971); EPA v. Steelco Chemical Corp., 1971 Ill. P.C.B. Nos. 137, 139 (Sept 16,

1971).
44. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
45. See Moody v. Flintkote Co., 1970 Il. P.C.B. No. 36, 1971 Ill. P.C.B. No. 67
(Sept. 2, 1971).
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sumably has a deeper understanding of the purposes and details of
such a system. Even if a permit system's validity or effects in a particular case, or in general, are subsequently raised at the appellate level, the administrative tribunal itself can make the clearest record on
these points. This also holds true for a polluter's compliance or noncompliance with the terms of46a variance or other exemption obtained
through administrative means.
Returning to the problems of evidence in litigation, the necessity
for technical evidence and advice has already been discussed.47 It
should be added, however, that through the discovery tools available
to the prosecutor, he can obtain considerable information regarding
technical defenses he is likely to meet.4" Discovery also affords the
prosecutor an opportunity to develop more information regarding effects of pollution, especially presently unseen or unnoticed effects
which seem merely annoying, but which may in fact cause serious
long-range harm. Such inquiries through discovery cannot, however,
substitute for the basic evidence required for a pollution complaint.
Basic complaint information may be provided by citizen testimony or by the observations of investigative personnel of the prosecutor or his client agency. With regard to localized pollution problems,
or sources not so major as to be familiar to the prosecutor and the public generally, it is only through the voicing of concern by a citizen or
a citizens' group that the matter will come to the attention of officials.
Just how many citizen complainants will be necessary in order to
make out the basic cause of action in a particular suit cannot be stated
in a general rule. A single, clear and persuasive witness with sound
observations over a sustained period of time may be sufficient, although obviously corroboration is tremendously helpful.49
46.

Id.

See Ingersoll, City Claims U.S. Steel Is Biggest Polluter By Far, Chi-

cago Sun-Times, July 28, 1971, at 4.

See also Appeal Bd. of the Dep't of Environ-

mental Control v. United States Steel Corp., 2 ERC 1706 (111. 1971).
47. See text accompanying notes 33, 34 .supra.
48. Discovery. (a) The following discovery procedures shall be ordered
by the Hearing Officer upon the written request of any party where necessary to expedite the proceedings, to ensure a clear or concise record, to ensure
a fair opportunity to prepare for the hearing, or to avoid surprise at the
hearing:
(i) production of documents or things;
(ii) depositions;
(iii) interrogatories.
The Hearing Officer shall restrict such discovery where necessary to prevent
undue delay or harassment.
(b) The Hearing Officer shall order the following discovery upon written
request of any party:
(i)
list of witnesses who may be called at the hearing;
(ii) reasonable inspection of premises by experts.
Illinois Pollution Control Bd., Procedural Rules, Pt. III, Rule 313 (1970).
49. See Glovka v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 1971 Il. P.C.B. No. 269 (Feb. 17,
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It is a useful fact of life to be kept in mind by the environmental
prosecutor that over a sustained period of time neighbors of a polluter
invariably become intensely familiar with operations at the polluting
source and the patterns and characteristics of its pollution.5" Of course,
the prosecutor should be aware of tendencies to exaggerate adverse
effects, or to confuse mingled effects from a number of sources in a
single area, but generally it will be found that citizens do not put
themselves through the inconvenience of involvement in pollution litigation unless and until they have become quite clear in their own minds
as to what the problem is. The testimony of such witnesses should be
limited to their actual observations and the identifiable effects of the
pollution on themselves and their property.
As a practical matter a prosecutor will do much more to eliminate pollution sources if he is receptive to settlement of appropriate
cases than he will by pursuing all or substantially all of his cases
through trial."' The reason for this should be evident, in light of
the previous comments regarding the relative readiness of many polluters to correct their problems quickly.52 Settlement initiatives
should, however, always originate with the polluter, inasmuch as it is
his primary responsibility to eliminate the pollution, and presumably he
knows the actual cause of the problem better than does the prosecutor.
The prosecutor, having filed suit and being prepared to see the matter
through, should indicate, if asked, that he is willing to evaluate abatement programs proposed by the polluter. Often this approach, with good
technical input guiding the prosecutor, results in an abatement schedule,
and either the dismissal of the suit or the entry of an agreed order setting
forth the schedule. 3 Whether a monetary penalty or some other sanction
1972). See also notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra. At one point, environmental officials in Illinois urged that a maximum limit on citizen witnesses in all
cases be set. The suggestion was, however, quickly deemed unworkable, in view of the
varying demands of proof in different cases.

50. See, e.g., transcript of citizen testimony in Molex, Inc. v. EPA, 1971 I11.
P.C.B. No. 200 (Jan. 6, 1972).
51. See People v. Chicago Magnet & Wire Corp., No. 71 CH 1410 (Cook
County, Il., Cir. Ct., stipulation entered, Mar. 22, 1972); People ex rel. Scott v.
Steelco Chemical Corp., No. 71 CH 3517 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., preliminary
injunction ordered by agreement, June 8, 1971); People ex rel. Scott v. The Penn
Central Co., No. 70 CH 5157 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., consent decree entered,
Mar. 15, 1971); People v. United States Steel Corp., No. 69 CH 3334 (Cook County,
Ill., Cir. Ct., consent decree entered, Jan. 18, 1971). See also People v. Wells Mfg.
Co., No. 70 CH 1794 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., dismissed per stipulation, Nov. 16,

1971).
52. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
53. See People v. Chicago Magnet & Wire Corp., No. 71 CH 1410 (Cook
County, Ill., Cir. Ct., stipulation entered, Mar. 22, 1972); People ex rel. Scott v.
Steelco Chemical Corp., No. 71 CH 3517 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., preliminary
injunction ordered by agreement, June 8, 1971); People ex rel. Scott v. The Penn
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or limitation on the polluter's activities will be incorporated in such a
settlement is dependent upon the particular circumstances of the case
and upon the general enforcement policy of the prosecutor.
Two interesting sidelights should be mentioned with respect to
settlements, both related to the fact that pollution cases at present are
very much in the public eye. First, if the polluter has not already
been informed that he is likely to be sued, it is advisable that he be
given direct notification by telephone or telegram immediately prior to
filing suit. If this is done as a courtesy, without any implied invitation
for the prosecutor to be talked out of filing, it will serve a valuable, if
limited, purpose-avoiding the embarrassment and resentment which
easily arises if the polluter first learns through the local press that he is
a defendant.
A second potential difficulty arises when a settlement is reached
which, as is often the case, is subject to conflicting technical opinions.
When this occurs, it is not unusual for voices to be raised saying that
the prosecutor has done less than he might or has given in to the defendant's wishes or false claims of technological incapability. Such
charges have an added potency when directed at a prosecutor having
the same political affiliation, or some other area of common interest,
or friendship, with the polluter whom he has seen fit to sue and with
whom he then has seen fit to settle. There is no easy way of avoiding
accusations of this sort. The prosecutor is best advised to concentrate
upon identifying a solution which the best experts available say will
work. If they are right, it should not be too long before actual abatement results undermine any "sellout" charges.
Finally, the prosecutor must be prepared in advance for the frequently offered defense that the polluter for some period of time has
been unable to ascertain with any certainty the exact nature of the regulations and laws to which he is subject. It is true that there has been
considerable change in applicable standards in recent years, and it is
certainly conceivable that a polluter may in fact have ended up with
an incomplete or ineffective control program as a result of trying to
keep up with standards which have been changed frequently, and not
necessarily consistently. The good faith of such a polluter, however,
is likely to be clear. Presumably he will have had some sort of communication with the standard-setting agency whose rules he has tried
Central Co., No. 70 CH 5157 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., consent decree entered,
Mar. 15, 1971); People v. United States Steel Corp., No. 69 CH 3334 (Cook County,

Ill., Cir. Ct., consent decree entered, Jan. 18, 1971).

One problem deserving consid-

erable further attention by prosecutors and other interested lawyers is the necessity to
develop guidelines or criteria for settlement of pollution cases. Much more thinking is

needed on the policies served by settlements, with respect to penalties, cessation of
pollution, timing of abatement schedules, and many other factors.
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to meet. Furthermore, his real effort at installing control equipment or
modifying his activities should be readily apparent.
More commonly and unfortunately, however, this claim is raised
as a smoke-screen for the fact that the polluter has not made an attempt
to comply with regulations, whether because of knowledge that the standards might subsequently change or for other, even less laudable reasons.5 4 It appears to be true that in most areas in which pollution standards have been subject to numerous changes, the changes have more or
less represented a progression of increasing control. If that is in fact the
case, the polluter who presents the defense that he was aware that the
standards were changing will either be well on the track toward meeting the present standards, or will clearly expose the fact that he is seeking only a belated justification for delay and inaction.
The problem of fluctuating standards is one which the prosecutor must consider if he is attempting to fashion a mandatory remedy
or to arrive at an abatement schedule with the polluter by agreement.
He must be aware of the possibility that an order that the polluter take
certain steps to comply with present law may make it difficult or impossible to require the polluter to meet more stringent, new requirements at some time in the near future." To the extent that this risk can
be avoided by providing for review or revision of such orders, or by
requiring the polluter regularly to keep up with advancing technology,
the problem can be minimized, although it remains a difficult one.
As the environmental prosecutor becomes increasingly familiar with
basic control techniques for various types of pollution problems, he
will realize the considerable extent to which certain basic pollution
control equipment which polluters are now turning to, whether by
choice or under compulsion, has been known and available for many
years, often with a very high degree of effectiveness. With this
awareness the prosecutor can make a realistic appraisal of the likelihood that the sound abatement program of today will be found obsolete tomorrow.
CONCLUSION

This discussion of the environmental prosecutor's role has at54. Considerable testimony bearing on this issue was heard in Moody v. Flintkote
Co., 1970 Ill. P.C.B. No. 36, 1971 Ill. P.C.B. No. 67 (Sept. 2, 1971).
55. This point was urged most strongly with respect to the possible effects of the
Refuse Act Permit Program of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and federal Environmental Protection Agency. Allegations that permits issued on the basis of compliance
with present water quality standards would protect polluters from later having to
avail themselves of more effective technological developments for reducing discharges of pollutants were embodied in litigation at the time the Program was initially
to go into effect. See 3 CLEAN Ant & WATER NEWS 217-18, 230 (1971); 2 ENV.

RPTR.--CuRR. DEV. 722 (1971).
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tempted to illuminate some of the problem areas that must be considered if his role is to be an effective one. There is still a tremendous
amount of experimentation and thought which must take place before
official litigation will be a reliable and efficient tool for protecting the
environment. It is hoped that the ideas and suggestions offered here
will be useful to some as this new field of prosecution matures. It is
also hoped that the initial thoughts and efforts of those working in
government and elsewhere to restore and preserve our environment
will ultimately prove not to have been too late.
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